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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
Dagestan: Russia’s Most Troublesome Republic 
Political and Religious Developments on the 
“Mountain of Tongues” 
Since 2014 the Ukraine conflict has tended to sideline 
a number of issues that remain significant for Russia. 
These include the situation on Russia’s Caucasian 
periphery. The patriotic fervour that greeted Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea cast the security situation in the 
North Caucasus in a deceptively positive light. This 
region stands out like no other part of the post-Soviet 
Russian Federation on account of the two Chechen 
wars, an ongoing Islamist insurgency elsewhere in the 
region, and manifold socio-economic problems. Until 
recently the North Caucasus was the most violent part 
of the entire post-Soviet space, with armed struggle 
costing hundreds of lives – civilians, security person-
nel and insurgents – every year. In 2014, however, 
the North Caucasus was overtaken by eastern Ukraine, 
where the fighting caused at least six thousand deaths 
by March 2015 (according to official figures; other esti-
mates put the toll much higher) and triggered massive 
refugee movements. At the same time foreign analysts 
continue to class the situation in the North Caucasus 
as a “permanent low level insurgency”. Unlike the three 
independent states of the South Caucasus (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia), external actors enjoy little access 
to the North Caucasus, whose development is regarded 
as Russia’s internal affair. Consequently, rather than 
addressing recommendations for action to Berlin or 
Brussels, our advice would be not to let the Ukraine 
crisis push this region off the Russia analysis agenda. 
At the eastern end of the Caucasus and the south-
ern periphery of the Russian Federation, Dagestan 
stands out in multiple respects. A population of about 
three million makes it by far the largest Caucasian 
republic, with its position on the Caspian Sea lending 
strategic importance. At the same time, about three 
dozen autochthonous nationalities live in a territory 
roughly the size of Denmark or West Virginia, making 
Dagestan the entity with the greatest ethnic diversity 
not only in the Caucasus, but in the entire post-Soviet 
space. Demographic and cultural developments in 
the post-Soviet era have made Dagestan, more so even 
than the other Caucasian republics, into Russia’s “in-
ternal abroad”, with emigration noticeably shrinking 
the ethnic Russian population and cultural difference 
vis-à-vis the centre growing. Since the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union, Dagestan has been characterised by a 
unique political system designed to account for its 
ethnic diversity, which sets it apart from the other 
twenty-one republics of the Russian Federation (not 
counting Crimea, annexed in 2014). Until 2006, a State 
Council comprising the fourteen largest ethnicities 
served as a collective leadership, in place of a president. 
Since then three figures appointed by the Kremlin 
have successively headed the republic in an ethno-
political balancing act between the two largest eth-
nicities, the Avars and the Dargins. 
Since about 2009 Dagestan has topped the statistics 
on “incidents of violence” for the Russian Federation. 
In 2013, in the North Caucasus as a whole, 529 people 
died in terrorist attacks and fighting between security 
forces and the Islamist insurgency: 104 civilians, 127 
members of the security forces and 298 insurgents; 
Dagestan accounted for 341 of the casualties. Although 
Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Russian Security Coun-
cil, reported a fall in terrorist violence in Russia in 
2013, 214 of the 218 incidents occurred in the North 
Caucasus, the majority in Dagestan. The number of 
deaths attributable to fighting in the North Caucasus 
in 2014 is significantly lower, with 341, 249 of whom 
were rebels. 
Chechnya was for a long time the epicentre of 
violence in the Caucasus, but armed conflict has 
receded there, with only small scattered groups 
reportedly still active. Instead, there are increasing 
numbers of Chechens fighting on various fronts far 
from their homeland, for example on both sides in 
eastern Ukraine, and above all in Syria and Iraq, 
in what is currently the most prominent and brutal 
jihadist campaign. Dagestan is increasingly becoming 
the centre of gravity of the homegrown Caucasus 
Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz), which since 2007 has formed 
the theocratic backbone of the underground Islamist 
movement. However, Chechnya lives under the heel 
of dictator Ramzan Kadyrov and one cannot speak of 
a genuine pacification. This was vividly demonstrated 
by terrorist attacks in the last quarter of 2014, when 
an attack on security forces and the Press House in 
Grozny on 4 December paralysed the city and left two 
dozen dead. 
As the most complex republic in ethno-demographic, 
cultural and religious terms, Dagestan deserves special 
attention in analysis of the Russian Federation. The 
present study sets out to address the specific questions 
that arise. How does its ethnic diversity, which sets 
Dagestan apart from all Russia’s other federal subjects, 
affect its politics and society? How is the development 
of the armed insurgency connected to socio-economic 
problems such as high youth unemployment, poor 
governance, and systematic corruption? How do po-
litical leaders in Moscow and the Dagestani capital 
Makhachkala respond to these problems and chal-
lenges? What impact did the wars in Chechnya have 
on neighbouring Dagestan? The trajectory of the 
Islamic “rebirth” in this part of Russia is of particular 
importance. Throughout the Soviet era Islamic tradi-
tion continued to play a role, while the post-Soviet 
period has witnessed the emergence of tensions be-
tween traditional (especially Sufi) and fundamentalist 
(Salafist, “Wahhabi”) variants of Islam. 
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Recent Developments in the North Caucasus 
 
The North Caucasus last drew concerted international 
attention around the Sochi Winter Olympics in Feb-
ruary 2014, before the Ukraine conflict came to a 
head. Threats from the Caucasus Emirate cast a shad-
ow over the big event, especially in the aftermath of 
attacks on civilian targets in Volgograd in October and 
December 2013. The Games were consequently held 
under maximum security precautions – and passed 
off without incident. Immediately after the Sochi 
Olympics Russia adopted a harder line against Ukraine, 
and Russian and international interest in the North 
Caucasus waned. The annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula and the accompanying propaganda gen-
erated a wave of patriotic fervour in Russia, in the 
course of which the North Caucasus situation became 
cast in a deceptively positive light. In January 2014 a 
survey by the Levada Centre was still showing just 
18 percent of Russians regarding the situation there 
as positive. But by March the figure had risen to 41 
percent, with the proportion classing the North Cau-
casus as “tense” down to 43 percent (from 60 percent 
in January).1 Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada Centre, 
said the figures revealed how news about Crimea and 
Ukraine had pushed reports about problems in the 
North Caucasus so far into the background that many 
Russians now believed the situation there had stabi-
lised.2 Other events may also have contributed to the 
shift, including reports of the death of Chechen rebel 
leader Doku Umarov, who had declared the jihadist 
Caucasus Emirate in 2007. Russian security forces also 
announced that the level of terrorist activity had 
 
1  “Vsplesk optimizma rossijan po otnošeniju k situacii na Kav-
kaze obuslovlen prisoedineniem Kryma k RF, uvereny sociologi” 
[Sociologists believe increased Russian optimism on Caucasus 
situation stems from annexation of Crimea], Kavkazskij Uzel, 15 
April 2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/240984 (accessed 
7 April 2015). The news portal “Kavkazskij Uzel” [The Caucasian 
knot], which is frequently cited as a source in the present study, 
was founded in 2001 by the human rights organisation Memorial. 
It provides comprehensive information on developments in the 
North and South Caucasus and southern Russia. 
2  “Počemu rossijane stali položitel’no ocenivat’ situaciju na 
Severnom Kavkaze” [Why Russians now see the North Caucasus 
situation positively], Novoe Delo, 21 April 2014, http://ndelo.ru/ 
politika-5/3057-lyubov-i-nenavist-v-protsentakh (accessed 7 April 
2015). 
receded and that prominent insurgents had been 
eliminated. 
In August 2014 the Federal Security Service an-
nounced counter-terrorism successes in the North 
Caucasus, although this met with scepticism in expert 
circles. The claim was that 328 “potential terrorists” 
had been detained in the first half of 2014. But given 
that the security forces pursue a policy of collective 
punishment in the North Caucasus, these may have 
been relatives and social contacts of insurgents, rather 
than active fighters themselves. In January 2015 the 
Russian interior ministry reported that 259 rebels, 
including 36 commanders, had been killed by security 
forces in 2014, and 421 insurgents detained. 
The overall Russian perception of terrorist threat 
shifted in the course of 2014, driven by the Kremlin’s 
massive propaganda since the outbreak of the Ukraine 
crisis. Opinion surveys show that dangers are now 
rarely associated with the Caucasus, but with Russia’s 
“external enemies”, first and foremost the United 
States.3 A survey in November 2014 found that more 
than 60 percent of Russians saw the main threat to 
their country coming from abroad, while only 18 per-
cent felt the danger was at home.4 
At the beginning of December 2014, however, 
the aforementioned assault on the Chechen capital 
Grozny brought the North Caucasus insurgency back 
into Russian threat perceptions. The region attracted 
further attention in the first quarter of 2015 through 
the supposed “Chechen links” in the assassination 
of Boris Nemtsov and escalating reports about North 
Caucasian fighters in Syria and Iraq. 
There is little sign of any lasting stabilisation in 
the North Caucasus. In 2009 then Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev declared the Caucasian periphery 
Russia’s biggest internal security challenge. In January 
2010 he made the region a federal district in its own 
right, comprising all the Caucasian republics apart 
 
3  In a recent opinion poll 22 percent of Russians said the United 
States presented a terrorist threat (2013: 4 percent), while just 
3 percent associated the Caucasus with such a threat (2013: 20 
percent). 13 percent regarded “radical Islamists” as a terror risk, 
7 percent the Ukraine. “Kavkaz ustupil mesto SŠA” [Caucasus 
falls behind USA], Kommersant, 21 October 2014. 
4  TASS, 28 January 2015. 
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8 
from Adygea, plus the south Russian Stavropol 
district, with Pyatigorsk in Stavropol district as its 
capital. Alexander Khloponin, a successful manager 
who had earned a positive reputation as governor 
of the Siberian district of Krasnoyarsk, was placed 
in charge of the North Caucasian Federal District 
as plenipotentiary envoy of the President. As such, 
Moscow was signalising a strategic shift in the North 
Caucasus. In place of a one-sided focus on military 
operations, which lay in the hands of the security 
organs and the “siloviki”, the Kremlin now turned to 
a policy of modernisation based on socio-economic 
reforms.5 Where Russia had previously largely closed 
off the region, new programmes were launched to 
open it up to domestic and foreign investment, for 
example courting Azerbaijan, as the South Caucasian 
economic heavyweight, for investment in its North 
Caucasian neighbourhood.6 70 percent of trade 
between Russia and Azerbaijan crosses Dagestan’s 
southern land border. Efforts to connect Dagestan 
and the South Caucasus are currently concentrating 
on a road-building project into Georgia, the Avaro-
Kakhetian highway linking Makhachkala and Tbilisi. 
Ahead of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, which 
was propagated not least as a regional development 
project, new resorts and winter sports centres were 
to be built in all the Caucasian republics. The project 
could be said to have followed the motto “tourism not 
terrorism” but immediately became a target for the 
armed insurgency. Four years after the “strategic turn” 
it was clear that the move had not really succeeded, 
and the precarious security situation had certainly not 
settled down. In May 2014 President Vladimir Putin 
installed a new head of the North Caucasian Federal 
District. This ended the Khloponin era, although he 
did retain his post as vice-premier in Moscow. On 18 
June 2014, in the latter function, he announced that 
the Russian government had abandoned large parts of 
its tourism programme for the problematic Caucasian 
region. Of seven projects originally planned, only 
three were now to be realised.7 Altogether the Krem-
lin’s hopes of attracting private investment as a means 
to pacify the region had been disappointed. 
Earlier, in 2012, Moscow had unveiled a develop-
ment programme for the North Caucasus with a 
 
5  Uwe Halbach, Russia’s Internal Abroad: The North Caucasus as an 
Emergency Zone at the Edge of Europe, SWP Research Paper 5/2010 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2010). 
6  Paul Goble, “Moscow Seeks Baku’s Help in Developing the 
North Caucasus”, ADA Biweekly 4, no. 20 (15 October 2011): 1. 
7  Lenta.ru, 25 June 2014. 
timeframe extending until 2025. It provided for invest-
ment totalling $70 billion, most of which was to be 
sourced from outside the state budget. Today that pro-
gramme is regarded as unrealistic, not least because of 
the faltering Russian economy. At the same time the 
Ukraine crisis has relegated the North Caucasus in the 
ranking of Russian security and development head-
aches. Former Russian finance minister Alexei Kudrin 
estimates that the investment required to integrate 
the Crimea into the Russian Federation could exceed 
the cost of reconstruction in the North Caucasus after 
the two Chechen wars.8 In 2014 Moscow cut its devel-
opment spending in the North Caucasus in association 
with the Ukraine crisis,9 while in July 2014 the chair 
of the Russian Audit Chamber expressed concerns 
about the budget assistance granted to the seven most 
highly subsidised regions: four North Caucasian re-
publics, including Dagestan, plus Altai, Tyva and 
Kamchatka.10 
In 2014 Russia’s Caucasian republics, and especially 
Dagestan, found themselves neglected through the with-
drawal of financial and military resources associated 
with the Kremlin’s Ukraine policy. Corresponding 
fears were expressed in October 2014 at a conference 
in Pyatigorsk, where one participant from Dagestan 
said that many in his republic were convinced that the 
war in the Ukraine was being fought at the expense 
of operations against militant Islamists in the North 
Caucasus, from where military resources were in-
creasingly being redeployed to the Ukrainian border. 
Other participants criticised Russia’s “double stand-
ards” over national self-determination, contrasting 
support for pro-Russian “freedom fighters” in eastern 
Ukraine with the massive military force used against 
Chechen “freedom fighters” in the North Caucasus.11 
Nor was Khloponin granted any lasting success in 
his political dealings. Local leaders like the Chechen 
autocrat Kadyrov preferred to deal directly with Mos-
cow, without detours to Pyatigorsk. On the very same 
day Khloponin was dismissed as head of the North 
 
8  Interview with Alexei Kudrin on “Nedelya”, published 17 May 
2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46WN_OaiWXs 
(accessed 7 April 2015). 
9  Valery Dzutsev, “With Eye on Ukraine, Kremlin Reduces Aid 
to the North Caucasus and Eases Travel Abroad”, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor 11, no. 80 (30 April 2014). 
10  Idem, “Russian Official Proposes Cutting Financial Aid to 
the North Caucasus”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 144 (6 August 
2014). 
11  Idem, “North Caucasians Point Out Moscow’s Double Stand-
ard on North Caucasus and Ukraine”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, 
no. 195 (3 November 2014). 
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Caucasian Federal District, Putin signed a decree estab-
lishing a dedicated ministry for the region’s affairs, 
signalising that it had absolutely no reason to fear any 
loss of attention in Moscow. The ministry, the decree 
states, will “make decisions on questions in connec-
tion with the socio-economic development of the 
North Caucasus”.12 So was the reform course associ-
ated with Khloponin to be maintained after all? 
Khloponin was succeeded in the North Caucasian 
Federal District by Sergej Melikov, an officer of Da-
gestani extraction who had previously been respon-
sible for the deployment of Russian interior ministry 
forces in the region. Regional experts read two signals 
for Russian policy in the North Caucasus into his 
appointment: firstly, a turn away from reform and 
development priorities, back to the security policy of 
the “siloviki”; secondly a prioritisation of Dagestan 
in this context.13 Although Russian elite forces were 
redeployed from the North Caucasus to the Ukrainian 
border in 2014, apparently relativising the region’s se-
curity status,14 a conference of North Caucasian repub-
lic heads in March 2015, chaired by Nikolai Patrushev, 
head of the Russian Security Council, reiterated the 
importance of combating extremism and terrorism 
in the region. Some commentators interpreted in-
creasing numbers of military exercises in the South-
ern Military District and the North Caucasus as a 
warning shot to neighbours in the South Caucasus.15 
Under Khloponin, Dagestan was already moving 
increasingly to the heart of the armed Islamist resist-
ance, through the Caucasus Emirate led by Chechen 
underground president Umarov. Chechnya slipped 
into the background in this respect. After Umarov’s 
death, which was not publicly announced until March 
2014 but had been suspected for months beforehand, 
Ali Abu Mukhammad (Aliaskhab Kebekov) succeeded 
to the leadership. Now, for the first time, there was a 
Dagestani leader at the head of the Caucasus Emirate, 
which had hitherto been largely dominated by 
Chechens. Since the end of the first Chechen war in 
 
12  Musa Muradov, “Severnyj Kavkaz ostavili za Aleksandrom 
Chloponym” [North Caucasus left to Alexander Khloponin], 
Kommersant, 16 May 2014. 
13  Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Appointment of General Melikov to 
Replace Khloponin Points to Kremlin Bid to Subdue Dagestani 
Insurgency”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 92 (16 May 2014). 
14  Valery Dzutsev, “War with Ukraine Pulls Best Russian Mili-
tary Units from North Caucasus”, Daily Monitor 11, no. 156 
(8 September 2014). 
15  Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Are Russian Military Exercises in the 
North Caucasus a Signal to Azerbaijan and Georgia?”, Jamestown 
Foundation Blog on Russia and Eurasia 12, no. 67 (10 April 2015). 
1996 a religiously driven jihad had increasingly sup-
planted ethno-nationalist slogans in the North Cauca-
sus insurgency. Chechnya’s insurgency stood for both: 
nationalist separatism and jihad. In the multi-ethnic 
republic of Dagestan, on the other hand, nationalist 
and separatist aspects were secondary. Instead, Dages-
tan is the historic emblem of nineteenth-century Mus-
lim anti-colonial resistance to tsarist forces. Today it 
forms the flashpoint of state counter-terrorism opera-
tions in the North Caucasus. In 2014 barely a week 
passed without a major operation, although contacts 
between security forces and rebels in the region as a 
whole fell in the course of the year.16 
With respect to underground Islamist activities, 
international attention moved on in 2014. The mur-
derous activities of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and 
Iraq and the global threat emanating from those 
quarters have sidelined the regional Islamist for-
mation of the Caucasus Emirate, even though many 
jihadists of North Caucasian provenance are active in 
IS and other groups in Syria and Iraq.17 According to 
the Federal Security Agency in Dagestan there were 
already about two hundred Dagestanis fighting against 
the Syrian regime in March 2014.18 They can expect 
to be imprisoned if they return to Russia, as a law of 
2013 provides for sentences of up to six years for 
 
16  These counter-terrorism operations caused massive disrup-
tion. In March 2014 forests were set alight in several districts of 
Dagestan, endangering the livelihoods of local populations. In 
November 2014 residents of a village in Untsukul district appealed 
to the public to take note of the enormous damage caused by 
permanent counter-terrorism operations in their area. See “Žiteli 
Vremennogo prosjat obščest’vennost’ prinjat’ učastie v ocenke 
ponesennogo imi uščerba” [Residents of Vremenyj ask public to 
note harm caused], Kavkazskij Uzel, 24 November 2014, http:// 
www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/252865 (accessed 13 April 2015). 
17  Guido Steinberg, A Chechen al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups Further 
Internationalise the Syrian Struggle, SWP Comment 31/2014 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2014); Emil Souleimanov, 
“Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War”, 
https://www.academia.edu/7998656/Globalizing_Jihad_North_ 
Caucasians_in_the_Syrian_Civil_War (accessed 13 April 2015); 
idem, “Von Groznyj nach Aleppo: Nordkaukasische Dschihadis-
ten im syrischen Bürgerkrieg”, Osteuropa 64, no. 8 (2014): 17–25; 
Murad Batal al Shishani, “Islamist North Caucasus Rebels Train-
ing a New Generation of Fighters in Syria”, Jamestown Foundation 
Militant Leadership Monitor, 2 October 2014; Mairbek Vatchagaev, 
“Number of Disillusioned North Caucasian Militants Returning 
from Syria Increases”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 189 (24 Octo-
ber 2014). 
18  “V Dagestane zaderžali boevika, voevavšego v Sirii” [Rebel 
who fought in Syria detained in Dagestan], Rossijskaja Gazeta, 
26 July 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2013/07/26/reg-skfo/terrorist-
anons.html (accessed 13 April 2015). 
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participation in militant formations fighting against 
Russian interests.19 
As far as possible IS blowback into Russia’s North 
Caucasus problems is concerned, assessments diverge. 
While returnees from fighting in Syria and Iraq could 
radicalise and brutalise the Islamist insurgency in 
their home region, the involvement of North Cau-
casian fighters in the IS campaign has also provoked 
an internal conflict that divides and weakens the 
Caucasus Emirate. Since the end of 2014 there have 
been increasing reports of splits in the Emirate and 
rifts within its new leadership, stemming above all 
from the involvement of North Caucasian fighters in 
the IS jihad in Syria. A growing number of field com-
manders (emirs) from Dagestan, Chechnya and other 
parts of the North Caucasus have sworn allegiance 
to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, thus placing them 
in opposition to the new leader of the Caucasus 
Emirate.20 
Shortly before this study was completed, it became 
known that Emir Abu Muhammad had died on 19 
April 2015, after serving as leader for just a year. He 
was reportedly killed in a Russian special forces opera-
tion in a village in the Bujnaksk district of Dagestan, 
in which altogether five people died.21 Splits in the 
Emirate are now expected to deepen and the influence 
of IS in the North Caucasian insurgency could poten-
tially increase. 
  
 
19  “Žitel’ Čečni Šachid Temirbulatov podozrevaetsja v učastii 
v voennych dejstvijach v Sirii” [Chechen Shahid Termirbulatov 
suspected of participation in fighting in Syria], Kavkazskij Uzel, 
9 January 2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/236388/ 
(accessed 13 April 2015). 
20  For more detail see “Dagestan in the Caucasus Emirate” 
below. 
21  Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Caucasus Emirate Amir Killed in 
Dagestan”, North Caucasus Weekly, 24 April 2015. 
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Mountain of Tongues: Dagestan as the Multi-ethnic Republic 
 
The tenth-century Arab geographer al-Masudi called 
the Caucasus “The Mountain of Tongues”. And no-
where in the region does the metaphor apply more 
convincingly than in Dagestan. With its Turko-Persian 
name, which emerged in the sixteenth century and 
means “land of mountains”, Dagestan differs from 
other national entities in Russia and the former Soviet 
Union in having a geographical rather than ethnic 
designation. Its autonomy is based not on one or two 
name-giving nationalities, as in the case of other 
republics, but on a multitude of autochthonous eth-
nicities. The ethnic diversity generates a Babel-like 
tangle of languages in a dense patchwork of identities. 
Languages practically unknown in Europe, such as 
Dargin, Tabasaran and Rutul, are further subdivided 
by linguists, with Dargin possessing a dozen dialects. 
However, the spread of Russian is increasingly stifling 
the use of indigenous languages in Dagestan and 
across the North Caucasus, as representatives of the 
Caucasian ethnicities complained at a conference 
in Stavropol in March 2015. 
Close to three dozen autochthonous ethnicities 
make up Dagestan’s population, which is today close 
to three million. Of these 29 percent are Avars and 
17 percent Dargins, both belonging to the Nakh-Dages-
tani language family in the narrower sense, along 
with Lezgians (13 percent), Laks (5.6 percent), Taba-
sarans (4.1 percent), Rutuls (1 percent) and others. The 
Turkic-Altaic ethnicities include Kumyks (15 percent) 
and Nogais (1.4 percent). Emigration has reduced the 
proportion of ethnic Russians from a good 10 percent 
at the end of the Soviet era to less than 3 percent today. 
The Chechen minority comprises 3.2 percent of the 
population, the Azerbaijani 4.5 percent. 
Dagestan thus differs from other republics in the 
North Caucasus, such as Chechnya and Ingushetia, 
which have achieved a high degree of ethnic homo-
geneity in the post-Soviet era, and from the binational 
“hyphenated republics” Kabardino-Balkaria and Kara-
chay-Cherkessia. In each of the latter, two titular 
nationalities – one larger, one smaller – compete over 
the political and economic power resources, with the 
smaller feeling discriminated in the ethnocracy of 
the larger. 
Is this ethnic diversity a conflict factor? In a sur-
vey in spring 2013 only 2.8 percent of respondents 
in Dagestan named inter-ethnic tensions as the main 
source of instability.22 So great ethnic diversity and 
complex inter-ethnic relations should not be regarded 
per se as conflictual. At the same time they have played 
a central role in the republic’s post-Soviet develop-
ment. 
At the beginning of the 1990s Valeryj Tishkov, a 
leading Russian ethnologist, described the transition 
from the multi-nationality Soviet state to the post-
Soviet period as an “explosion of the ethnic” (vzryv 
etničnosti). The metaphor turned out to be especially 
pertinent in the case of Dagestan, where one national 
front after another appeared with demands for autono-
my or territory.23 During this period inter-ethnic rela-
tions were certainly tense. In an opinion poll con-
ducted in 1994 in the capital Makhachkala, 52 percent 
said they were willing to fight for their ethnic group 
in armed conflict.24 
The “explosion of the ethnic” became especially 
risky in regions where the post-Soviet state borders 
intersected the settlement areas of particular ethnic-
ities. Borders that had served purely administrative 
purposes in Soviet times now divided states, and their 
laws, customs and economies.25 In Dagestan this con-
cerned above all the “Lezgian question” on the south-
ern border with Azerbaijan. At the beginning of the 
1990s the Sadval national movement fought for an 
independent state uniting Lezgian settlements on 
both sides of the Samur river that marks the border. 
Correspondingly, they also rejected moves to fortify 
the frontier to Azerbaijan. In Soviet times Lezgian 
shepherds had driven their flocks unhindered across 
 
22  “Opros: Žiteli Dagestana nazvali tri glavnye pričiny vspleska 
nasilija v respublike” [Survey: Dagestanis name three main rea-
sons for violence], Caucasus Times, 10 May 2013. 
23  First the Nogai movement Birlik (unity), then the Lezgian Sad-
val (also: unity), the Avar Shamil Popular Front, the Kumyk Tenglik 
(equality), the Dargin Zadeh, the Lak Gazi-Kumukh and others. 
24  Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat (New Haven et al.: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 100. 
25  Otto Luchterhandt, Dagestan – Unaufhaltsamer Zerfall einer 
gewachsenen Kultur interethnischer Balance? (Hamburg: Institut für 
Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, September 1999), 13. 
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the border in search of summer grazing. The Nogai 
settlements, which are divided between Dagestan, 
Chechnya and the Stavropol district, also witnessed 
irredentism during the period of the national move-
ments. Close to the Chechen border, the Akkin nation-
ality problem arose in the Dagestani districts of Novo-
lak and Khasavyurt, when Chechens deported in 1944 
returned in the Chrushchev era to find a new ethnic 
composition, after members of other groups had been 
settled there. 
On the other hand, ethnic diversity also mitigated 
against separatism. While a secessionist movement 
against Russian supremacy developed in neighbouring 
Chechnya from 1991, no republic-wide separatism of 
an ethno-nationalist slant was to emerge in Dagestan. 
As Rasul Gamzatov, the best-known Dagestani writer, 
said: Dagestan had not joined Russia of its own voli-
tion, and had no intention to leave voluntarily. And 
indeed, opinion polls show identification with Russia 
on a par with ethnic and local identities. Despite grow-
ing identification with Islam, the Dagestani popula-
tion differentiates itself from Russia and the Russians 
less than for example the Muslim population of 
Tatarstan in the Russian interior.26 However, it must 
be remembered that ethnic Russians make up just a 
tiny minority in Dagestan, but half the population 
in Tatarstan. Dagestanis do note an increasing anti-
Caucasian xenophobia, for example among the Rus-
sian majority in the neighbouring district of Stavro-
pol, where Cossack formations have been established 
to police Caucasian migrants. 
Nor is Dagestan’s loyalty exactly reciprocated with-
in Russia. Whereas 44 percent of Russian citizens in 
recent surveys identify Ukrainians and Belarusians as 
“Russians”, only 7 percent would say the same about 
North Caucasians like Dagestanis, Chechens and 
Ingushians.27 Nevertheless, in 2014 Russia resumed 
conscripting North Caucasians to the armed forces, 
after having largely exempted them during the pre-
vious decade. But the recruitment quotas remain 
relatively low: in 2014 Dagestan was expected to sup-
ply two thousand men, the other republics between 
five and fifteen hundred. The move was justified on 
the basis that Russia must prepare to fight wars on 
 
26  Natalja Gontscharowa, “Russische Muslime in Tatarstan und 
Dagestan: Zwischen Autonomie und Integration”, in Auf der Suche 
nach Eurasien: Politik, Religion und Alltagskultur zwischen Russland und 
Europa, ed. Markus Kaiser, 220–47 (226f.) (Bielefeld, 2004). 
27  “Rossijane sčitajut Krym svoim, a nasčet Kavkaza – somne-
vajutsja” [Russians regard Crimea as theirs – less sure about 
Caucasus], Radio City FM: Vse novosti Moskvy, 21 February 2014. 
several fronts, including regions where Europe meets 
Asia. North Caucasians are ideally suited for that task, 
it is argued, with Chechens having proven their loyalty 
in conflicts in South Ossetia and Ukraine.28 
Separatism in Dagestan today is less a matter of 
ethno-nationalist organisations than Islamist net-
works fighting the rule of the “infidel”. Equally, the 
lines of division and conflict in society today tend to 
run between opposing versions of Islamic “rebirth”, 
such as Salafism and Sufism, to which we will return 
in greater detail below. Ethnic diversity also encour-
ages a certain degree of political pluralism, which 
distinguishes Dagestan from neighbouring Chechnya, 
the latter having degenerated into a kind of private 
state under Moscow’s dictator Kadyrov. In Dagestan 
the need for ethno-political equilibrium has to date 
precluded autocracy. 
Politically, post-Soviet Dagestan cloaked its ethnic 
diversity in an oligarchy, where a State Council with 
members from the fourteen main ethnicities func-
tioned as a collective head of state, while initially 
doing without a president. Plebiscites held in 1992, 
1993 and 1999 all rejected proposals for presidential 
elections, motivated by concern not to upset the 
republic’s inter-ethnic balance. The highest office 
was chair of the State Council, which was to rotate 
between prominent representatives of the larger 
ethnicities. This structure, which distinguished 
Dagestan from other Russian republics, was supposed 
to ensure cohesion and integration within the Russian 
Federation. In fact, however, the system was so domi-
nated by complex relations between ethnic power 
groups that the political leadership was largely pre-
occupied with balancing individual clan interests and 
found itself unable to respond adequately to urgent 
socio-economic and security challenges. Moreover, the 
proposed rotation principle was not actually applied. 
The first chairman, the Dargin Magomedali Magome-
dov, lasted fourteen years as the head of the State 
Council and substitute president, to the chagrin of the 
Avars and other ethnicities. In 2004, Moscow grasped 
the opportunity presented by a new law permitting 
the President of the Federation to appoint the admin-
istrative heads of the republics and regions to inter-
vene in this political structure, and introduce the 
office of president (later head of the republic) in Dages-
 
28  Quoted from Valery Dzutsev, “Russia May Use North 
Caucasians for Hybrid Warfare in Central Asia and European 
Conflicts”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 178 (8 October 2014). 
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tan too.29 In 2006, President Putin appointed Mukhu 
Aliyev, previously speaker of parliament, as first 
President of the Republic. The Magomedov clan was 
compensated by a son of the outgoing State Council 
chairman succeeding as speaker. 
This institutional change came at a point where 
crisis and conflict in Dagestan were threatening to 
surpass Islam-led radicalisation in the Chechen arena 
that had already brought forth an armed insurgency. 
However, the political relevance of ethnicity was not 
completely overshadowed by trans-ethnic identifica-
tion with Islam. The “Lezgian question” burdening 
relations between Dagestan and Azerbaijan remains 
acute today (or, it could be said, has resurfaced). The 
problem sharpened in 2010 after two Lezgian villages 
were handed to Azerbaijan. Azeri political and eco-
nomic influence engenders mistrust in Dagestan. 
Demonstrations occurred in southern Dagestan 
against Azerbaijan’s supposedly repressive nationality 
policy which was said to disadvantage not only the 
Lezgians but also the approximately fifty thousand 
Avars living in Azerbaijan. In 2014 protests occurred 
after a street in Derbent, the oldest and most souther-
ly city in the Russian Federation, was renamed after 
Azerbaijan’s state icon Heydar Aliyev. Ethnic conflict 
potential also finds expression in border conflicts 
with neighbouring Chechnya, affecting the Dagestani 
districts of Novolak and Khasavyurt.30 
 
 
 
29  The title of “president” has since been replaced with “head 
of republic” (glava respubliki) in all the republics apart from 
Tatarstan, on the grounds that there is only one President in 
Russia. 
30  Musa Musayev, “Jugoslavskij scenarij dlja Dagestana?” [A Yu-
goslav scenario for Dagestan?], Sevkainform.ru, 20 February 2015 
http://sevkavinform.ru/articles/society/mezhdu-molotom-i-
nakovalney-risk-raspada-dagestana-usilivaetsya-/ (accessed 7 April 
2015). 
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Islamic “Rebirth” and Islamist Uprising 
 
Dagestan also occupies a special position in the reli-
gious history of the Russian and Soviet empires. It 
was one of the first regions in the territory of today’s 
Russian Federation – and indeed the entire post-Soviet 
space – to convert to Islam, already in the seventh 
century. To understand the position of Dagestan in 
the majority Muslim North Caucasus, one must also 
consider the resistance offered by the mountain 
people in the east of the region against Russia’s nine-
teenth-century colonial expansion. This struggle was 
couched in religious terms and stood under the leader-
ship of Islamic authorities such as Imam Shamil. 
Dagestan formed the centre of a resistance declared as 
jihad or ghazwa,31 which contemporary Islamist net-
works such as the Caucasus Emirate cite as their model 
today. In their terminology the Dagestani capital is 
Shamil-Kala (in memory of the historic Imam Shamil, 
rather than the Chechen terrorist leader Shamil 
Basayev). 
During the early Soviet era there were still about 
2,500 mosques and hundreds of religious schools in 
Dagestan, representing probably the highest density of 
Islamic institutions in the entire Soviet Union. Thou-
sands of mullahs, popularly referred to as “Arabists”, 
supplied a broad theological base. After the Soviet 
authorities began suppressing Islamic institutions 
from the end of the 1920s, religion existed largely as 
an “unofficial” or “parallel” Islam. By the 1970s “offi-
cial Islam” in Dagestan was restricted to two dozen 
“working mosques” and about fifty mullahs under 
state oversight. But below that level religion and tra-
dition were kept alive in everyday rituals and family 
rites, as well as in a network of “holy sites”, including 
the tombs of prominent Sufi sheikhs, which became 
places of pilgrimages. At the same time, currents 
calling for strict obedience of sharia appeared during 
the late Soviet period, rejecting everything not demon-
strably mentioned in the Koran and Sunnah as un-
lawful innovations (bid’ah). In this milieu traditional 
practices such as the pilgrimages to the holy tombs 
 
31  Russian sources on the colonial war in the eastern North 
Caucasus between the 1830s and 1859 refer to the Islamic 
resistance of the mountain peoples as gazavat, derived from 
the Arabic ghazwa (also the source of the Italian “razzia”). 
were regarded as “heathen”. Here we already see 
signs of the fracture between traditional and funda-
mentalist religion that has erupted into open conflict 
in today’s Dagestan. Given that Islam was not in fact 
“extinguished” during the Soviet era (especially in 
Dagestan, where there was nothing unusual about 
senior party officials joining Sufi brotherhoods, or 
tariqas), the term “rebirth” for a growing turn to Islam 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union needs 
to be placed in quote marks. 
By the end of the first post-Soviet decade there were 
already about two thousand mosques and ten Islamic 
colleges.32 Oversight over this expanding “official Islam” 
was now conducted by the republic muftiate DUMD 
(the Russian acronym for the Spiritual Administration 
of the Muslims of Dagestan), which emerged in 1992, 
alongside other ethnic and republic muftiates, from 
the Soviet-era Spiritual Administration of the Muslims 
of the North Caucasus (Russian acronym DUMSK). As 
in other Muslim states and societies in the post-Soviet 
space, however, the “official clergy” stood under sus-
picion of loyalty to the regime and collaboration with 
the state, and were unable to shake off the Soviet-era 
stigma of “the KGB’s Islam”. DUMD and the official 
clergy were now responsible above all for arranging 
pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia, in which Dagestani Mus-
lims participated in large numbers; in 2012 according 
to official figures they made up 8,450 of the total of 
20,500 from Russia.33 
In place of the leaders of ethnic national move-
ments, who characterised the political landscape at 
the beginning of the post-Soviet period, religious 
actors became increasingly prominent both in local 
congregations (jama’at) and at the republic level. This 
development heightened a contradiction between 
 
32  Luchterhandt, Dagestan (see note 25), 28. Today there are 
1,290 Friday mosques, 827 local mosques and 79 religious 
schools (medressas) in Dagestan. Asiat Buttaeva, “Islam in 
Polyconfessional Daghestan”, Central Asia and the Caucasus 13, 
no. 1 (2012): 68–78 (70). 
33  “Iz Dagestana otpravilsja pervyj rejs s palomnikami po 
blagotvoritel’noj linii Sulejmana Kerimova” [First pilgrimage 
sets off from Dagestan with charitable support from Suleyman 
Kerimov], Kavkazskij Uzel, 1 October 2013, http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/230912 (accessed 7 April 2015). 
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traditional and neo-fundamentalist variants of the 
Islamic “rebirth”, which boils down to “Sufism versus 
Salafism”. This antagonism generated conflicts be-
tween generations, within families, within mosques 
and at the political level of the republic.34 In many 
communities the polarisation led to competition 
between two rival mosques, one attended by the 
“Salafists”, the other by traditional believers.35 
The call to “pure”, “unadulterated” “early” Islam 
appeared especially attractive to young people. The 
appeal was directed against the arrangements by 
which their parents’ generation had guarded Islam 
and tradition through the anti-religious Soviet era, 
against the cooperation of the official clergy with 
organs of state power, and against the political and 
social turmoil of the post-Soviet period, especially 
rampant corruption in the administration. Where 
even the secular judiciary was characterised by venal-
ity, the call for exclusive application of sharia quickly 
found a hearing, especially among the youth. A study 
of the factors driving Islamisation among the young in 
Dagestan found that the proportion of “believers” in 
this group had risen to 95 percent by 2010. The study 
characterised 77 percent of the young people as “strict 
believers” who wished to see Islam practised as it was 
in the time of the Prophet (up from 54 percent around 
the year 2000). Dagestan’s youth thus offers a field of 
recruitment for a process characterised as “shariatisa-
tion”.36 Along the southern periphery of the Russian 
Federation sharia represents a kind of “alternative jus-
tice”. Although standing in contradiction to Russian 
law, it is used to dispense justice at the local level 
with the consent of the involved parties.37 The call for 
 
34  On the relationship between religious identity and lines of 
conflict in Dagestan, see Manarsha Isaeva, “Religious Identity 
and Conflict in Dagestan”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 153 
(25 July 2014): 5–8. 
35  Vachtang Kumaev, “Problema dvuch mečetej i odnoj religii” 
[The problem of two mosques and one religion], Dagestanskaja 
Pravda, 28 June 2014. 
36  Zaid Abdullagatov, “O vlijanii religioznogo faktora na ekstre-
mistskoe povedenie dagestanskoj molodeži” [The influence of 
the religious factor on extremist behaviour among Dagestani 
youth], http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Socis/2012_1/Abdulagatov. 
pdf (accessed 7 April 2015); Wojciev Górecki, No Change in 
the Russian Caucasus: The Winter Olympics Amid a Local War, OSW 
Studies 47 (Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, January 
2014), 54. 
37  Aleksej Malashenko, “Dagestan on the Eve of the Olympics”, 
16 January 2014, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=54210 
(accessed 7 April 2015). On application of and support for sharia 
in Dagestan, see also: International Crisis Group (ICG), The North 
Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Europe Report 226 (Brus-
“Islamic justice” motivates Dagestani youth more than 
any other idea, as demonstrated by the omnipresence 
of Islamic symbolism in public space. Whereas neigh-
bouring Chechnya has experienced an Islamisation 
“from above” under Kadyrov, the process in Dagestan 
has flowed as it were “from below”, out of the midst 
of society.38 
In 2012 the political leadership in Dagestan initi-
ated a dialogue between the rival Islamic factions, 
bringing together representatives of both sides for a 
meeting in the Grand Mosque in Makhachkala in 
April 2012. DUMD represented the adherents of Sufism 
(tariqat), the scholars of Ahl al-Sunna the Salafists.39 A 
joint resolution issued in May calling upon believers 
to refrain from violence and avoid defaming the other 
side as “infidels”, in other words not to make frivolous 
accusations of apostacy (takfir). Together with the 
authorities in Dagestan, the Kremlin also organised 
two international theological conferences in 2012, 
attended by Islamic scholars from the Middle East. At 
the first, held on 25/26 May in Moscow, more than two 
hundred influential Islamic scholars and experts from 
twenty countries met with the Russia’s official Islamic 
clergy. The second conference was held in November 
2012 in Makhachkala, under the title “Dagestan is a 
territory of peace”, and was attended by the Interna-
tional Union of Muslim Scholars under its secretary-
general Ali Al-Muhiddin Karadagi. A conference reso-
lution opposing violence was framed as a legally 
binding religious fatwa, although it failed to impress 
the Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus: the 
dialogue process was accompanied by repeated attacks 
on clergy, especially prominent Sufi sheikhs. 
 
sels, 6 September 2013), 47ff., http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ 
media/Files/europe/caucasus/226-the-north-caucasus-the-
challenges-of-integration-iii-governance-elections-rule-of-law.pdf 
(accessed 7 April 2015). 
38  “We must return to our traditions,” is the Chechen dictator’s 
message to his subjects. However these supposed traditions rep-
resent norms that are closer to the repertoire of the Islamist 
insurgency against which Kadyrov is fighting than to the authen-
tic culture of the Chechen people. They include dress codes for 
women, male marital prerogatives and application of sharia. 
In fact, while insisting on his loyalty to Putin and the Kremlin, 
Kadyrov has established an “Islamic state” within the Russian 
Federation. His objective in so doing is to raise his profile as a 
Chechen political and religious leader while stealing the insur-
gents’ thunder. 
39  “‘Islamskoe primirenie’ i budušče Dagestana” [“Islamic paci-
fication” and the future of Dagestan], Moj Dagestan, 6 June 2012, 
http://moidagestan.ru/news/analytics/18745 (accessed 7 April 
2015). 
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The Origins of the Insurgency 
Gordon Hahn’s study on Islam in Russia distinguishes 
three periods of “re-Islamisation” in Dagestan, two of 
which were associated with violence.40 The first phase 
was the transition from the Soviet to the post-Soviet 
era (1986–1991), which was associated, as outlined 
above, with tensions between traditional and fun-
damentalist forms of Islamic “rebirth”. The first post-
Soviet decade (1991–1999) then saw growing Salafist 
influence (discussed across the CIS as “Wahhabi”) 
and spillover effects from the wars in neighbouring 
Chechnya. 
At the beginning of the 1990s religious leaders 
from Dagestan played a prominent role in founding 
Islamic parties in the still extant Soviet Union and in 
Russia. The Russia-wide Islamic Revival Party, led by 
the doctor Akhmed-Kadi Akhtayev, an Avar from the 
home region of the historic Imam Shamil, represented 
a moderate Islamist current. The Union of Muslims of 
Russia was led by the Dagestani Nadir Khachilaev. This 
period marked the beginning of a process of “jihadisa-
tion” of Caucasian Islam, originating in the eastern 
North Caucasus (above all Chechnya) but especially 
strongly affecting Dagestan. Towards the end of the 
1990s the “Wahhabis” gained ground in Dagestan, 
founding their own congregations (jama’at), seizing 
control of local mosques and attacking “heathen” cer-
emonies and Sufi tombs and holy sites. Political Islam 
increasingly came under influences from Chechnya, 
and foreign organisations supporting the armed up-
rising there.41 
In 1998/1999 prominent Chechen and foreign field 
commanders in the underground Chechen Republic 
of Ichkeria, such as Shamil Basayev and the Arab Ibn 
al-Khattab, called for the jihad to be expanded to 
Dagestan, seeking an Islamic state transcending the 
existing borders in the North Caucasus. The escalating 
violence cost the life of the chair of the Spiritual 
Administration of the Muslims of Dagestan, a deter-
mined adherent of traditional Islam and Sufism. In 
August 1999 three largely Dargin villages in western 
and central Dagestan declared a separate “Islamic 
territory”, under sharia, and several thousand Che-
chens led by Basayev crossed into Dagestan to join 
their fellow believers in the enclaves. But most Da-
 
40  Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat (see note 24), 104–11. 
41  See in particular Jean-François Ratelle, Radical Islam and 
the Chechen War Spillover: A Political Ethnographic Reassessment of 
the Upsurge of Violence in the North Caucasus since 2009 (Ottawa: Uni-
versity of Ottawa, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2013). 
gestanis opposed the Islamist offensive and formed 
militias to repel “aggression from the neighbouring 
republic”. The polyethnic population of Dagestan 
regarded Chechnya as its principal external threat. 
Developments since 1999, the third period, have 
been characterised by escalating confrontation be-
tween state organs and Islamist opposition, and 
between supporters of traditional and fundamentalist/ 
purist currents in Islam. In this situation, the state 
organs and the official clergy acted jointly to counter 
the Islamist challenge. In September 1999 Dagestan 
passed a law against “Wahhabism” that gave the re-
public muftiate DUMD supreme oversight over reli-
gious activities (but did nothing to enhance its 
religious authority in the eyes of the population). This 
throwing down of the gauntlet against “Wahhabism”, 
which certain representatives of DUMD even present-
ed as “jihad”, also radicalised the official clergy. Citing 
Sufism and traditionalism, they treated the “Wah-
habis” as heretics who had to be fought against. The 
republic mufti and DUMD chair said that a believer 
who killed a “Wahhabi” would go to paradise just like 
all the believers who had been killed by them.42 In 
Russia and the Muslim regions of the post-Soviet space 
“Wahhabism” became a catchword tarring observing 
Muslims, peaceful political Islamists and terrorists 
with the same brush. In 2002 a representative of a 
mosque in southern Russia, who confirmed that there 
were indeed Islamist troublemakers in his congrega-
tion, described the consequence as follows: “Today we 
have another problem too. If someone performs their 
prayers correctly, does not drink, does not smoke, does 
not curse, then they think he is a Wahhabi. Today 
every militia member thinks he is an expert on Wah-
habism.” 43 
In Dagestan this development increasingly drove 
religiously active groups and a section of the youth 
underground. And this tended to broaden rather than 
restrict recruiting opportunities for jihadists. They 
gained a new point of reference in October 2007, 
when the last Chechen underground president, Doku 
Umarov, declared the Caucasus Emirate. Now terrorist 
attacks targeted not only representatives of the state 
security and administrative organs, but increasingly 
 
42  Quoted from Moshe Gammer, “Nationalisme(s), Islam(s) et 
Politique au Daghestan”, in Religion et politique dans le Caucase 
post-sovietique, ed. Bayram Balci and Raoul Motika (Paris, 2007), 
149–61 (157). 
43  “Každyj milicioner – specialist po vachchabizmu” [Every 
militiaman an expert on Wahhabism], Gazeta Juga, Nalchik, 
30 May 2002. 
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also senior representatives of the official clergy. Al-
together in the North Caucasus forty senior clergy 
were killed between 2009 and August 2014, most 
recently the mufti of the Republic of North Ossetia. In 
Dagestan such attacks affected prominent Sufi sheikhs 
who attracted attention as ideological adversaries of 
the “Wahhabis” or Salafists. Umarov himself had been 
a member of the Kunta Haji order before becoming 
a radical Salafist. He is regarded as one of the most 
controversial figures in the Islamic resistance in the 
North Caucasus. His six-year “reign” as emir was char-
acterised by contradictory decisions and a dispute 
(fitna) within the emirate leadership in 2010/2011.44 
Dagestan increasingly stood out among the regional 
sectors of the Islamist uprising in the North Caucasus, 
and was in turn divided into dozens of local jama’at. 
Unlike the Chechen jihadists, the Dagestani “forest 
brothers” live in rural and urban settlements rather 
than hiding out in inaccessible mountain and forest 
regions.45 
Dagestan in the Caucasus Emirate 
When it was founded in 2007, the Caucasus Emirate 
subdivided its sphere of influence into six provinces 
(“vilayats”), which covered the entire North Caucasus 
but ignored its existing administrative divisions and 
introduced new territorial designations.46 In fact, the 
Emirate exercises at most rudimentary territorial 
authority in the sense of running alternative admin-
istrative structures and supplying services to the popu-
lation. Its grip on the local level principally involves 
coordinating insurgent activities, and even there only 
partially because the local fighting units operate rela-
tively autonomously. Later Umarov also projected his 
 
44  The fitna in the Caucasus Emirate lasted from August 2010 to 
July 2011. The dispute was triggered by Umarov first announcing 
and then withdrawing his resignation. The handover supposedly 
suffered procedural errors irreconcilable with sharia. It is thought 
that the background to the dispute was partly ideological and 
strategic differences between nationalists and Islamists in the in-
surgency, partly doubts about Umarov’s style of leadership. See 
Uwe Halbach and Michail Logvinov, Das Kaukasus-Emirat und der 
internationale Jihadismus, SWP-Aktuell 41/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2012). 
45  Mairbek Vatchagaev, “The Epicenter of Insurgency – A Net 
Assessment of the Situation in the Northeast Caucasus since the 
Start of 2014”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 182 (15 October 2014). 
46  Dagestan, Nokhchicho (Chechnya), Galgaiche, Iriston (Ingu-
shetia), the United Vilayats of Kabarda, Balkaria and Karachay, 
and the Nogai Steppe. 
Emirate into the interior of the Russian Federation, 
such as the Tatar regions on the Volga. Gradually 
Vilayat Dagestan became the heart and most active 
part of the emirate, ahead even of Chechnya (Vilayat 
Nokhchicho). Opinions diverge concerning the viabil-
ity of this virtual theocracy following Umarov’s death 
in 2013. Some commentators believe the Imarat Kavkaz 
is on its way out, its structures now only discernible 
in Dagestan. Others say it is too soon to speak of a 
weakening of the Emirate and the Islamist insurgency 
in the North Caucasus.47 
The new Emir Ali Abu Mukhammad (originally 
Aliaskhab Kebekov, born 1976), came from the largely 
Avar village of Teletl in a central Dagestani district 
named after Imam Shamil. He rose within the Cau-
casus Emirate to become its qadi, or senior judge, in 
2010. As such he intervened in July 2011 to end the 
aforementioned fitna. He is reported to possess basic 
knowledge of Arabic and Islamic theology, which sets 
him apart from his theologically less educated pre-
decessor. On the other hand, he has less military ex-
perience than Umarov and his Chechen compatriots.48 
According to the Russian security forces, whose claims 
always merit a dose of scepticism, it was Abu Mukham-
mad who ordered the assassination of Dagestan’s most 
prominent Sufi sheikh, Said Afandi al-Chirkawi, by a 
female suicide bomber in 2012. 
Abu Mukhammad was the first non-Chechen com-
mander-in-chief and leading “emir” of the Islamist 
insurgency in the North Caucasus. He possessed little 
in the way of relationships with the old guard of the 
armed uprising, who had earned their spurs in the 
two Chechen wars. He was reportedly supported by 
the four emirs of the vilayats Dagestan, Ingushetia, 
Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria-Karachay, against 
the candidacy of Aslambek Vadalov, a prominent Che-
chen field commander.49 Once in charge, Abu Mukham-
mad made contradictory statements on operations 
against civilian targets and on Caucasian fighters in the 
foreign jihad in Syria. Since 2012 a statement has been 
expected from the Caucasus Emirate on the activities 
of North Caucasian, overwhelmingly Chechen, jihad-
 
47  Magomed Tuaev, “Naznačenie predstavitelja Dagestana lide-
rom ‘Imarata Kavkaz’ govorit o transformacii podpol’ja, sčitajut 
eksperty” [Appointment of Dagestani as leader of “Caucasus 
Emirate” suggests transformation of insurgency, experts say], 
Kavkazskij Uzel, 21 April 2014, http://dagestan.kavkaz-uzel.ru/ 
articles/239778 (accessed 7 April 2015). 
48  Emil Souleimanov, “Prospects for the Caucasus Emirate 
under Kebekov’s Leadership”, CACI Analyst, 5 August 2014. 
49  Ibid. 
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ists participating in the Islamist advance in Syria and 
Iraq. Renowned Chechen field commanders have led 
brigades in different, sometimes warring, formations, 
such as ISIS, Jaish al Muhajirin wal-Ansar and Jabhat 
an-Nusra.50 Autonomously operating North Caucasian/ 
Chechen groups have also been seen. 
Abu Mukhammad had tense relations above all 
with Umar ash-Shishani, the “star” among the Cau-
casian jihadists on the Syrian front. Shishani is a 
Georgian from the Pankisi Valley, which is inhabited 
by the Chechen-connected Kist people. In one of his 
first video messages as emir of the Caucasus, Abu 
Mukhammad forbade Shishani from speaking publicly 
on the subject of jihad, on the grounds of his lack of 
theological training. As such the new emir took the 
side of al-Qaeda leader Aiman al-Zawahiri and the 
Qaeda-affiliated jihadist network Jabhat an-Nusra in 
Syria; at the same time he criticised ash-Shishani’s 
connections to the “Islamic State” and stressed 
al-Qaeda’s leadership in global jihad. In another mes-
sage he called on his North Caucasian compatriots to 
distance themselves from rival groups in foreign jihad 
fronts and swear allegiance to him rather than to the 
leaders of those groups. This earned him the hostility 
of Caucasian jihadists linked to ISIS/IS, who mocked 
him in a video of their own. On the other hand, he 
was supported by Usman Gimrinski, qadi of the Cau-
casus Emirate and emir of the mountain sector of 
Vilayat Dagestan. Gimrinski also attacked the North 
Caucasian IS fighters and firmly contradicted Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi’s claim to the title of caliph. 
These disputes point to splits between North Cauca-
sians fighting in Syria and the insurgents in the North 
Caucasus with their base in Dagestan.51 But Islamist 
actors within the North Caucasus have also contra-
dicted the new emir over their loyalty towards the 
Syrian jihad: In December 2014 two important field 
Dagestani commanders of the insurgency – the leader 
of Sharia Jama’a, Rustam Aseldarov, and the former 
emir of Shamil-Kala (Makhachkala), Arsanali Kambu-
latov – declared their allegiance to the Islamic State. 
In the following weeks further emirs in Dagestan and 
other parts of the North Caucasus came out on the 
side of IS leader al-Baghdadi. By the beginning of 2015 
 
50  Steinberg, A Chechen al-Qaeda? (see note 17); Murad Bata 
al Shishani, “Islamist North Caucasian Rebels Training a New 
Generation of Fighters in Syria”, Terrorism Monitor 12, no. 3 
(February 2014). 
51  Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Statement by New Leader of Caucasus 
Emirate Creates Rift among Chechen Groups Operating in Syria”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 21 (3 July 2014). 
some experts already believed that the internal dis-
putes over the relationship to IS had brought Vilayat 
Dagestan, the most active sector of the Caucasus 
Emirate, to “the brink of total collapse”.52 
Another bone of contention was introduced by an 
hour-long video message placed on the internet in 
May 2014, where Abu Mukhammad discussed suicide 
attacks against civilian targets. Although such mar-
tyrdom operations represented a “demonstration of 
belief”, he said, they should follow tactical considera-
tions and where possible avoid civilian victims because 
Islam forbade the deliberate killing of women, chil-
dren and the old. In this statement Abu Mukhammad 
categorically opposes the participation of women in 
suicide attacks. Since 2000 female suicide attackers – 
so-called “black widows” – have featured in the Che-
chen and North Caucasian insurgency and in terrorist 
attacks in the region and in Russia’s interior. Now the 
emir was forbidding his field commanders from using 
women for attacks.53 While Abu Mukhammad said 
that he himself had personally forbidden women to 
take part in suicide attacks, this is contradicted by the 
Russian security forces, which assert that he used a 
“shhahida” (female martyr) from Dagestan, the Rus-
sian convert Amina Saprikina, for the assassination 
of Sheikh al-Chirkawi in 2012 
The statement renouncing attacks on civilian 
targets generated speculation as to whether Sochi 
Winter Olympics in February 2014 had been able to 
pass off without incident on account of a change of 
leadership and strategy within the Caucasus Emir-
ate.54 In fact there had already been contradictory 
statements on the permissibility of civilian victims in 
jihad under Abu Mukhammad’s predecessor Umarov. 
Spectacular attacks against “soft targets” and civilians 
in Russia’s interior were initially followed by a mora-
torium that was lifted again in the run-up to the Olym-
pic Games to permit new threats against civilians. 
As emir, Abu Mukhammad also generally called for a 
harder fight against “the infidel” and Russian rule 
over Dagestan and the North Caucasus. 
The Caucasus Emirate leadership’s attitude towards 
Sufism also remains ambiguous. According to Abu 
Mukhammad, its adherents were not automatically 
 
52  Idem, “The Islamic State Is Set to Replace the Caucasus Emir-
ate in the North Caucasus”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 12, no. 4 (8 Janu-
ary 2015). 
53  “New North Caucasus Insurgency Leader Seeks to Avoid 
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enemies of the jihadist movement in the North Cau-
casus. They had, he said, been driven into conflict 
against the Salafists by the official clergy (in which 
tariqat representatives are involved at senior levels). 
However, he said, the Emirate’s struggle continued to 
be directed against elements who collaborated with 
the authorities. Two years earlier Doku Umarov also 
said that the Sufis were brothers and called on them 
to support the Islamist uprising.55 Both currents – 
Salafism and Sufism – regard sharia as the ideal form 
of organisation of society. But the differences over 
what is religiously legitimate run deep, and affect the 
everyday lives of Dagestanis. Whereas traditional 
Islam proved to be compatible with Soviet and secular 
culture over many decades, radical Islam rejects the 
inclusion of secular customs in social life. One of 
many topics of contention is the new year celebration, 
which many Dagestanis regard as a traditional cel-
ebration but the Salafists condemn as heathen. 
The death of Abu Mukhammad on 19 April 2015 
poses the question whether Dagestani jihadists will 
continue to supply the leader of the emirate, and 
to what extent this virtual theocracy remains an in-
dependent force. However vital and capable the 
Caucasus Emirate turns out to be under new leader-
ship, one thing is clear: an Islam controlled or 
managed by state authorities cannot represent the 
alternative to underground religious organisation. 
Enver Kisriyev, a Moscow-based regional expert of 
Dagestani extraction, underlined this in October 2014: 
“People are forced into oppositionist forms of Islam 
because they reject the policy of government-spon-
sored religious organisations.” 56 
 
 
 
55  Idem, “Abu Muhammad Named New Dagestani Amir of 
Caucasus Emirate”, Jamestown Militant Leadership Monitor 5, no. 9 
(30 September 2014). 
56  Enver Kisrijew, “Konfessional’nye problemy javljajutsja sled-
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Socio-economic Problems and Conflicts 
 
In the official statistics on the districts of the Russian 
Federation, the North Caucasus stands out for its 
socio-economic problems. Its unemployment rate is 
higher than Russia’s other districts, especially affect-
ing the young. Average earnings are lower, and labour 
migration to Russia’s interior stronger than from 
other peripheral regions.57 
During the Soviet era Dagestan was in fact one of 
the more economically dynamic regions, and home 
to a naval base, various strategic institutes, important 
arms factories, and a scientific and technical college.58 
But after the demise of the Soviet Union, Dagestan’s 
GDP fell and a significant shortage of employment 
arose. From the outset the younger generation was 
worst affected, in a republic where more than half of 
the population is aged under thirty. In 2009, then 
President Mukhu Aliyev pointed out that Dagestan’s 
population was growing at a rate of thirty thousand 
per annum, whereas in the same period just nine 
thousand new jobs had been created.59 Towards the 
end of the first post-Soviet decade a majority of the 
population was living below the poverty line. More 
than three-quarters of the republic’s government 
funds were federal transfers, controlled by a group 
made up of about 6,500 members of various clans.60 
Corruption is far worse than the Russian average. 
Aliyev said in 2005 that not a single government job 
could be acquired without bribery.61 Even a lowly rank 
in the police force cost up to $5,000 at that time, a 
ministerial post up to $500,000.62 Field research in 
Dagestan has found a widespread belief, especially 
 
57  In 2013 the average monthly wage in Dagestan was about 
16,700 roubles (approx. $510), significantly below the Russian 
Federation average of 23,000 roubles ($710). The official un-
employment rate in Dagestan fell to 12 percent in 2012, but 
this was still considerably above the average for the Federation. 
Górecki, No Change in the Russian Caucasus (see note 36), 31. 
58  Arbakhan Magomedov, “Dagestan and the Russian State: 
‘Stable Instability’ Forever?”, Russian Analytical Digest 70 (2009):  
9–13 (10). 
59  Ibid. 
60  Shireen Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and 
Security (Armonk, 2004), 44. 
61  Quoted from Tony Wood, Chechnya: The Case for Independence 
(London, 2007), 140. 
62  Ibid., 149. 
among the young, that corruption impedes social 
mobility and makes it impossible to a job matching 
one’s qualifications.63 
Economic development is also paralysed by the clan 
ties that are particularly typical of Dagestan. Two busi-
nessmen of Dagestani extraction, Suleyman Kerimov 
and Ziyavudin Magomedov, are included in the Forbes 
list of Russia’s wealthiest citizens. Although they did 
not make their fortunes at home in Dagestan, they 
compete for major investment contracts there and 
maintain close relations with the successive govern-
ments in Makhachkala. This has the consequence that 
economic concessions are redistributed when the 
government changes.64 
Dagestan possesses relevant energy resources. Ex-
ploiting them could liberate the republic from the 
state budget of the Russian Federation, from which, 
as outlined above, most of its funding originates. The 
current Head of the Republic, Ramazan Abdulatipov, 
complained in 2014 that Dagestan had to import 85 
percent of its natural gas needs, despite possessing its 
own reserves of 800 billion cubic metres. The Russian 
government, he said, was plainly not interested in 
initiating the development of energy resources in the 
Caucasus republic and reducing its financial depend-
ency on the centre.65 
In the industrial sector, on the other hand, Dages-
tan has demonstrated impressive growth rates in the 
past two years: 137.5 percent in 2013 and almost 140 
percent in the first ten months of 2014. While these 
are currently the absolute highest amongst Russia’s 
federal subjects, they owe less to indigenous economic 
growth than to massive investment from the centre. 
Funds have flowed above all into arms manufacturers, 
which in Soviet times formed a stand-out in the repub-
lic’s industrial portfolio. These investment flows have 
 
63  Ratelle, Radical Islam and the Chechen War Spillover (see note 41), 
111. 
64  Andrej Melamedov, “Mešanina klanovych interesov i družes-
kich svjazej” [Mix of clan interests and friendship ties], gazeta.ru, 
13 January 2014, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/01/04_a_ 
5829881.shtml (accessed 7 April 2015). 
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intensified in light of the Ukraine crisis. In other sec-
tors, such as engineering, the figures are declining. 
The republic’s leadership cites the aggregate indus-
trial growth data to cast Dagestan’s economic develop-
ment in a positive light, but this conveys a distorted 
picture of reality.66 
Opinion surveys show that the population regards 
economic problems as more pressing than the pre-
carious security situation. In a survey of 475 Dagestan 
citizens in spring 2013, 61 percent named social and 
economic problems, especially the high level of youth 
unemployment, as a major problem. The security situa-
tion (terrorism and crime) came only second, with 
50 percent. And inter-ethnic relations, which foreign 
researchers so like to focus on, ranked far behind.67 
The respondents associated the escalation of violence 
in their republic primarily with problems like un-
employment and corruption (71 percent), only in 
second place (17 percent) with the influence of the 
external forces that the post-Soviet power elites are 
so quick to blame for instability. A large majority 
(91 percent) said in a survey in summer 2010 that 
systemic corruption harmed the republic more than 
religious and other extremism.68 
Respondents also expressed clear views about 
human rights violations as cause and symptom of 
instability: 49 percent complained that state organs 
violated the “right to protection of life”, while 29 per-
cent felt that the “right to protection against arbitrary 
arrest” was ignored.69 At a conference on countering 
religious extremism held at the beginning of August 
2014 in Makhachkala, critical statements on these 
issues were heard from speakers with connections to 
the republic government for the first time. The activ-
ities of the federal and local law enforcement bodies 
were, they said, not only inadequate, but illegal attacks 
on the civilian population were counterproductive 
and provoked intra-Islamic conflicts in the first place. 
In February 2014 the republic government addressed 
the supposed connection between socio-economic prob-
lems and Islamist insurgency by concluding an agree-
ment with the administration of the district of Untsu-
kul and the village of Gimri. For years the mountain-
ous region there had formed an especially fruitful 
 
66  Idem, “Dagestan’s Industrial Output Grows Strongly – 
Thanks to Defense Spending and Loss of Russian Facilities in 
Ukraine”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 213 (1 December 2014). 
67  “Opros: Žiteli Dagestana” (see note 22). 
68  “Daghestan’s President Suffers Further Rebuff”, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 January 2011. 
69  “Opros: Žiteli Dagestana” (see note 22). 
recruiting ground for the insurgency and had become 
the scene of permanent anti-terror operations. The 
Gimri agreement promises the district’s residents 
better pay and social services if they support the fight 
against terrorism.70 
However, regional experts warn against treating 
poverty and other socio-economic problems as a catch-
all explanation for extremism and violence. High 
youth unemployment, they say, had become a mantra 
for local leaders seeking to explain destabilisation. 
But this, the experts object, represents nothing but an 
attempt to avoid deeper analysis of the causes of the 
spread of extremism, criminality and violence. More-
over, they say, the official socio-economic data needs 
to be treated with caution given the existence of a 
broad shadow economy outside the scope of fiscal and 
statistical recording. Indeed, 50 to 60 percent of eco-
nomic activity in Dagestan lies in the unofficial econo-
my.71 Moreover, there are considerable differences 
within the republic. Whereas ratings place Dagestan 
as a whole thirty-third in the ranking of the attrac-
tiveness for investment in Russian districts,72 its capi-
tal is one of Russia’s more dynamic cities.73 Here huge 
sums are being invested in projects including a port 
expansion, building new factories and promoting 
tourism on the Caspian Sea. 
At the end of October 2014 Dagestan’s parliament 
held an unusually open discussion of the inadequate 
political response to the republic’s grave socio-eco-
nomic problems. Matters that are largely passed over 
in silence in other parts of the North Caucasus, such 
as the fact that political elites and office-holders 
possess enormous riches for which they pay no taxes, 
were openly named. Dagestan, it was argued, pos-
sessed large potential for additional tax revenues, and 
a good third of land ownership in the capital was 
unregistered. Head of the Republic Abdulatipov also 
complained bitterly about this state of affairs, but at 
the same time admitted that he had no quick political 
solutions at hand.74 
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As in other parts of the Caucasus, especially Geor-
gia, where more than half the population also works 
in agriculture, development problems in farming are 
especially pressing. Despite its favourable climate, 
Dagestan’s agricultural productivity lies far below 
other regions of Russia. The sector is especially im-
portant, given that more than 60 percent of Dages-
tan’s population lives in the rural regions, and a 
technological modernisation has been on the agenda 
for years. A referendum in 1993 rejected land privati-
sation, but tiny plots were subsequently passed into 
private ownership. More than 80 percent of agricul-
tural output originates from extremely small opera-
tions using the most rudimentary techniques. Espe-
cially when it comes to distributing scarce land 
resources, socio-economic problems intersect with 
inter-ethnic. In certain regions of Dagestan, such as 
the Kumyk areas and districts affected by the Akkin 
problem, land distribution has become a conflict 
factor. 
In fiscal respects Dagestan, like the other North 
Caucasian republics, numbers among the federal sub-
jects most heavily dependent on the federal budget. In 
2014 Moscow’s budget subsidy for Ingushetia was 83 
percent, Chechnya 82 percent, Dagestan 70 percent, 
Karachay-Cherkessia 65 percent, North Ossetia and 
Kabardino-Balkaria each 55 percent.75 Alone the recon-
struction of Chechnya after the destruction of the two 
wars, for which Ramzan Kadyrov claims credit but was 
in fact largely funded by the centre, has consumed 
considerable sums. On top of this come the funding 
of the protectorates of Abkhazia (70 percent of whose 
budget comes from Moscow) and South Ossetia (91 
percent), whose secession from Georgia the Kremlin 
supported. The subsidisation of federal subjects and 
protectorates in the Caucasus has popularised the 
slogan “Stop featherbedding the Caucasus!” among 
the population of Russia’s interior and fanned an anti-
Caucasian xenophobia. In fact, on a per-capita basis 
other regions of Russia receive much greater support 
from the centre. 
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Political Developments 2006–2014 
 
As far as the political climate is concerned, the Repub-
lic of Dagestan is relatively liberal in comparison to 
Chechnya. and its civil society is stronger than in Kady-
rov’s fiefdom. There is also – unlike in Chechnya – at 
least limited freedom of the press. As described earlier, 
Dagestan’s ethnic diversity supports a certain degree 
of political pluralism and hinders autocratic moves, 
with its multi-ethnic status long preventing the intro-
duction of a single-person as president or head of the 
republic. Not until early 2006 did the Kremlin install 
the Avar Mukhu Aliyev as president. In the Soviet era 
he had been a high-ranking party functionary, and 
later for ten years served as speaker of parliament. He 
was regarded as a “man of the people” in a republic 
where political power had traditionally been tied to 
the support of local and ethnic patronage networks. 
Aliyev, it appeared initially, stood above that system 
of clans. 
Hopes of anti-corruption and better governance 
were to be disappointed, however. The slogan “No 
to corruption and nepotism!”, which ushered in the 
leadership change, dissipated. Instead the economy 
deteriorated and the security situation remained 
precarious. Senior government officials were killed 
in terrorist attacks. For all the hopes that had been 
placed in him, Aliyev’s term ended in disappointment 
after three years. 
Moscow replaced him in 2009 with Magomedsalam 
Magomedov, son of the long-serving State Council 
chair and substitute president. This shifted political 
power in the ethnic spectrum from the Avars back to 
the Dargins. The new president found himself con-
fronted with the legacy of the fourteen-year rule of 
his father Magomedali Magomedov, which the inter-
vening office-holder Aliyev had failed to tackle. This 
meant above all corruption and nepotism. Moscow 
deployed Magomedsalam Magomedov on the inter-
national stage, for example for a state visit to Jordan 
in October 2010, seeking to persuade King Abdullah to 
work together in the fight against religious extremism 
and terrorism. In Dagestan Magomedov worked above 
all to promote dialogue between the conflicting Sufis 
and Salafists and for the reintegration of the “forest 
brothers”, the insurgency, into society. The afore-
mentioned conferences with Islamic scholars from 
the Middle East also fell in his term of office.76 He also 
convened a Dagestani congress of ethnicities in Decem-
ber 2010, whose almost three thousand participants 
condemned religious extremism and terrorism and 
called on the populace to support the fight against 
the insurgency. One outcome of the congress was the 
creation of a committee for the reintegration of under-
ground fighters. But like his predecessors, Magomed-
salam Magomedov was unable to improve the security 
situation. Although the Republic’s interior minister 
put the number of insurgents in 2010 at only 190, dis-
tributed across nine militant groups, fighting flared 
between security forces and rebels in Makhachkala, 
Khasavyurt and Derbent, and in the rural districts of 
Buynaksk and Untsukul.77 Continuing security ten-
sions finally led Moscow to initiate yet another leader-
ship change. 
At the beginning of 2013 the Kremlin replaced 
Magomedov with Ramazan Abdulatipov. Abdulatipov 
is probably the Dagestani best-known in Moscow, 
where he was regarded as an expert for inter-ethnic 
relations and religious conflicts in the North Cauca-
sus; in 1999/2000 he briefly headed the Ministry for 
Nationality Affairs and Federal Relations before it was 
scrapped a year later. So once again a figure of hope 
stepped up to lead the republic, promising first of all 
to fight corruption and clan patronage. He had dozens 
of local administrators replaced, and sent a dramatic 
signal to the powerful clan leaders, breaking the power 
of Said Amirov, mayor of the capital since 1998 and 
regarded as one of Dagestan’s most influential figures 
with a large following. Previously several assassination 
attempts had been made on Amirov’s life. He was 
arrested in June 2013 and handed over to Moscow, 
where he was charged with the murder of an investi-
gator in a criminal case against him. 
Although Abdulatipov’s campaign against corrup-
tion and nepotism led to the replacement of personnel, 
the underlying structures remained almost untouched. 
It was not to be expected that a problem like clanism 
and patronage, which has such fundamental social 
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and political significance for Dagestan, could simply 
be abolished at a stroke. The problem is determined by 
many criteria of belonging and community alongside 
the ethnic, and decisively shapes the republic’s poli-
tics and business life. Moreover, counter-insurgency 
remained the top priority and overshadowed reform 
programmes. The practice of counter-terrorism opera-
tions in the Abdulatipov era was characterised by a 
clear strengthening of the “siloviki” and the security 
forces. The security apparatus returned to earlier 
methods for fighting the rebels. As in Chechnya, the 
houses of relatives of fighters are blown up and de-
tained “terror suspects” enjoy little expectation of a 
fair trial. Abdulatipov responds to complaints from 
citizens about heavy-handedness and impunity of the 
security forces with the argument that Dagestan needs 
to “cleanse itself”, and that requires a great deal of 
patience. 
After two years under Abdulatipov’s leadership, 
however, criticism of the government is growing. It 
is also expressed by Putin’s new presidential envoy 
in the North Caucasus, the Dagestani Sergei Melikov. 
Awareness of a systemic crisis has grown in the repub-
lic. And again the people wait for Moscow to inter-
vene.78 
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Russia regards neighbouring Ukraine as an internally 
torn state, a “non-state” according to President Putin. 
But Russia ignores the extent to which it is itself chal-
lenged by unresolved internal integration problems, 
above all in the North Caucasus and by an “internal 
abroad” like Dagestan. Russia’s position in the Cau-
casian region as a whole remains contradictory. On 
the one hand, the Kremlin counts the South Caucasus 
as part of its “privileged sphere of influence” in the 
post-Soviet space; in this sense, Russia binds a country 
like Armenia into its integrative Eurasian Economic 
Union project and responds with pressure and threats 
to Euro-Atlantic moves affecting Georgia’s foreign poli-
cy and security. On the other hand, Moscow struggles 
to ensure security, stability or even simply good gov-
ernance in its own Caucasian periphery. Dagestan can 
be regarded as a prime example of that failure. 
Dagestan is not only the most complicated republic 
of the Russian Federation. It belongs in the broadest 
sense to Europe, because the largely Muslim North 
Caucasus is geographically part of European Russia. 
And while Europe enjoys little access to the North 
Caucasus, the South Caucasus forms a relevant sector 
of the European Union’s eastern neighbourhood. 
Research into post-Soviet developments has generally 
treated the North and South Caucasus separately. But 
already in the transition from the Soviet to the post-
Soviet period critical intersections existed between 
North and South Caucasian crisis and conflict regions. 
With its borders to Azerbaijan and Georgia, Dagestan 
represents such an intersection.79 
From the European perspective, however, it is most 
relevant that the zone of Islamist insurgency in the 
post-Soviet space lies not in Central Asia, on the borders 
to Afghanistan, but in the North Caucasus; in other 
words, on Europe’s southern periphery. This is easily 
overlooked, because terrorist activities emanating 
from here have to date proliferated not into the terri-
tory of the European Union, but into Russia’s interior. 
In fact, Dagestan has displaced Chechnya, to which 
external perceptions of the North Caucasus were large-
 
79  Uwe Halbach, Trennlinien und Schnittstellen zwischen Nord- und 
Südkaukasus, SWP-Aktuell 31/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, June 2012). 
ly restricted in the post-Soviet era, to the margins 
of the North Caucasian insurgency, and increasingly 
itself become the centre of the jihadist Caucasus 
Emirate. 
Although the number of attacks and deaths fell in 
2014 in the North Caucasus, and disputes within the 
emirate raise questions concerning its viability, the 
insurgency in Dagestan and the broader North Cau-
casus nonetheless remains a security challenge – for 
Europe as well as for Russia. The apparently relatively 
large number of fighters that have travelled from 
Chechnya, Dagestan and other parts of the Caucasus 
to Syria and Iraq indicates that the security relevance 
of Caucasian jihadism extends far beyond Russia itself. 
While the groups operating there tend to be labelled 
“Chechens” they actually include recruits from Da-
gestan and other republics as well as from the North 
Caucasian diasporas in Turkey, Germany and other 
European states. It cannot be excluded the new con-
nections forged in Syria will also affect the security 
situation in Europe. After a period in the shadow of 
the Ukraine conflict, the rise of the Islamic State re-
turned the North Caucasus to the heart of the security 
discourse in 2015, in Russia too. 
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